Yesterday I mentioned a good idea I'd had some time ago for reducing credit
card fraud online. I also mentioned the term "Net Speed" as an indicator
of the pace at which investors and innovators must move in order to protect
such good ideas in cyerbspace.
Well as if to prove my point, I read today that my good idea has, at least in
part, just been launched in the USA in a partnership between VISA and a
company called Trintech Group.
So... now that the cat's out of the bag... here's the guts of what I was proposing.
The big problem with credit cards on the Net is that all the information required
to submit a transaction is either stored on the card or can be calculated and
guessed pretty easily. In short, all you need is a valid card number (and
there are plenty of programs that will produce these or the fraudster can
simply get ahold of a valid card number by various means), a name and an expiry
date.
In effect -- anyone who can get a look at your card or a zip-zapped receipt
created by your card now has full access to your line of credit.
Fraudsters armed with card-number generation software can produce huge lists
of valid card numbers and then submit them to a number of online shopping sites.
Of course they don't know the expiry date -- but they can simply keep trying
different dates (often at a range of different online stores) until they find
the one that works.
My solution to the problem was to set up an independent validation service that
invited card-holders to register with them. On registering their credit card,
the card-holder would be given a PIN number.
Vendors wishing to take advantage of the system would also register with the
service and then be able to submit any pending transaction to the service for
validation.
In effect -- a registered customer would visit a registered vendor and
enter his credit card details as normal. On pressing the submit button,
the vendor's system would call the independent validation service which
would then ask the customer to enter their PIN number to complete the
transaction. The part of the transaction involving the customer submitting
their PIN number would completely bypass the vendor site -- the vendor
would never see this additional piece of information -- they would simply
receive an "accepted" or "declined" response.
Now, and here's one of the best features, if an incorrect PIN number was entered,
the validation service would immediately send an email to the registered card-holder
advising them that if it wasn't them who had just attempted to submit a transaction
with an invalid PIN number then someone was attempting to fraudulently use their
card. They could then contact the vendor and ask that other information (such
as the delivery address submitted by the fraudster) be forwarded to the relevant
authorities or the bank for investigation.
The system would also be designed so that the actual user's card number was
never actually submitted to the validation service as part of the transaction
approval process. In fact, one of the key components of my design was
a system that meant that the card numbers of registered users was never
actually stored on any of the validation service's computers. This means
that even if the security of the validation service was compromised, a hacker
would be unable to obtain any information of value.
Now the smarter amongst you will be saying "but what's to stop a fraudster
registering stolen credit card details with the service?"
To be truly effective, such a service would require that those who registered
their card details also submitted a signature in hardcopy form. This would
meet the bank's criteria for insuring a transaction. Without any hardcopy
signature, the vendor takes the risk -- with a signature it's the bank who
carries the loss of a fraudulent transaction.
To get around this situation, those wishing to register their card details
could print a form published on the Web, sign it and mail it to the validation
service. Alternatively, as would seem to be the case with the company
that has just announced a similar system, an arrangement could be made
with the banks to auto-register all newly issued cards.
One version of the business plan associated with this idea involves a
small cardholder "registration fee" of $5 or so which not only helps offset the setup
costs, but also provides a verifying transaction to prove the integrity of
the submitted information.
Like most of my ideas, this has even more potential than might first be seen
and provides multiple revenue streams. For example, the operator of this
service has the email and postal addresses of many millions of people with
a proven line of credit. When signing up they would be invited to receive
"special offers" from approved merchants -- thus allowing those who opted
in to be added to a direct-marketing database. That alone is worth many,
many millions of dollars over a period of time.
So... there you have it -- another billion dollar opportunity lost because
I've been so damned busy just working to pay the bills that I couldn't afford to
exploit it.
Looking at my "ideas diary" I see that I first thought of this
concept some 15 months ago -- which would have been plenty of time to get
it off the ground and capitalise on today's e-commerce boom well ahead of
the venture that has just announced their plans to do the same.
Ah well... never mind, I still have more than a dozen other ideas of similar
calibre that are languishing for lack of time and money to exploit them.
Fortunately the list is being added to on a regular basis -- there really are
an incredible number of opportunities and a huge amount of money to be made
in this new cyberworld.
It's just a shame that the governments which purport to run this country
in the best interest of its citizens are so hell-bent on driving away people
like myself who have these ideas.
Who Goofed?
Gosh... what do you think of these new spectrum auctions then?
Looks as if someone in government has goofed big-time. Have I missed something
here or does it appear that we have a situation where the amount of spectrum on offer
is closely matched to the number of bidders -- so there's no need for them
to bid against each other.
It's as if there were three identical houses for auction and just three
bidders -- nobody's going to bid above the reserve if there's enough
for everyone are they?
I suspect the government has realised, albeit a little too late, that
they've stuffed up wholesale here and Cullen tried to salvage the situation
by putting things on hold -- usign the excuse that they must wait until the
result of the appeal case brought by Maori was handed down.
Why the hell didn't the government auction one third of the spectrum each
year over the next few years. That would have encouraged fierce bidding
and a much better return... wouldn't it?
While socialist governments have their strong points and merits -- they
really seem way out of their depth when it comes to managing the country's
resources so as to provide a good return to the shareholders (ie: the citizens).
And that kind of makes it hard to fulfill all those social-service promises
doesn't it?
As always, your feedback is welcomed.